by Zoltanous

Communism and Fascism, typically seen as polar opposites on the ideological spectrum, reveal unexpected similarities when examining Italian Fascism and Soviet Communism. Both regimes faced significant challenges, and their diplomatic interactions, particularly the economic and non-aggression pacts between Italy and the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, highlight a strategic partnership that transcended ideological divides. This collaboration, motivated by diplomatic isolation and the pursuit of strategic advantages, suggests that ideological adherence can be secondary to political and economic interests. The recognition of practical parallels between Stalinism and Fascism, coupled with Mussolini’s admiration for Soviet methods, breaks conventional categorizations. The mutual influence and acknowledgment between these regimes challenge the simplistic binary of left versus right, pointing to a nuanced interplay of ideas that could bridge ideological gaps for pragmatic purposes.

Fascism emerges as a fusion of ideas from Marx and Nietzsche, with Georges Sorel playing a pivotal role in national-revolutionary ideology. Sorel, a dissident from French Marxism, reinterprets Marx through a Nietzschean perspective, giving rise to Sorelian revolutionary nationalism as a foundation for Mussolini’s Fascist movement. The influence of Sorel’s reinterpretation of Marx through a Nietzschean lens is essential in understanding the development of Fascist ideology, particularly in Mussolini’s regime. Karl Marx, a materialist, analyzed bourgeois capitalist society through a sociological lens rather than an ethical or metaphysical one. Friedrich Nietzsche, the atheist philosopher, was a vitalist and shared a philosophical current with Henri Bergson during the turn of the century. Both Nietzsche and Marx utilized methodological materialism to interpret spiritual phenomena based on various foundations, with Marxist materialism focusing on economic aspects when analyzing bourgeois culture. Nietzsche’s contributions to philosophy included his theories on tragic truth and the heroic act, key points in Giovanni Gentile’s Actual Idealism.

Moving forward, the prominent figure associated with the development of fascism, distinguishing itself from revolutionary nationalism in a broader sense, is Benito Mussolini. Interestingly, Mussolini, described by historian Ernst Nolte as the first communist in Western Europe, has strong ties to Marxism. He openly acknowledges the influence of Georges Sorel on his ideological framework, indicating a significant impact on his own thoughts. Therefore, delving into Sorel’s work becomes crucial in comprehending the origins of Fascist ideology, given that Sorelism does not inherently lead to Fascism, and alternative non-Fascist revolutionary nationalisms are conceivable.

It is essential to note that Mussolini never truly sheds his Marxist roots. Rather than viewing Marx as a phase to be surpassed upon encountering Nietzsche, Mussolini’s original revolutionary Fascism embodies a kind of Marxist deviation, offering a unique interpretation of Marx’s ideas. Ernst Nolte emphasizes this perspective in his essay The Influence of Marx and Nietzsche on The Socialism of Young Mussolini, underscoring the nuanced relationship between Marx, Nietzsche, and Mussolini’s socialism:

“As a preliminary work to any investigation, one thing must be recorded: whatever is said in detail about Mussolini’s Marxism, the truth is that he always declared himself a Marxist and vehemently rejected any of the doubts that, not infrequently, time, they spoke out about their orthodoxy. / At the time when the nineteen-year-old young man spent his nights, hungry and helpless, under the arch bridge of Lausanne, a nickel medal with the image of Karl Marx is the only metal object in his pockets. / Mussolini never misses the opportunity to commemorate the “father and teacher” as the “compass” of the proletarian and socialist movement.”

— Ernst Nolte, The Influence of Marx and Nietzsche on The Socialism of Young Mussolini

The impact of Nietzsche on Mussolini’s thinking does not signify a progression beyond Marx; instead, it signifies a reinterpretation of Marx through a Nietzschean lens. Consequently, Mussolini can be viewed as embodying elements of both Marxism and Nietzschean philosophy, forming a unique amalgamation.

“Finally, the word “development” should not be understood in the sense of a change in convictions that occurs over time. It is not that Mussolini was first a young and fanatical follower of Marxism, whose ideas he later surpassed (or lost) under the influence of Nietzsche, Pareto, Bergson and the Italian national tradition, until breaking with the socialist party. There are, without a doubt, accents that shift and opinions that alter. His position towards unionism and towards Sorel, for example, is not the same in 1909 as in 1912. But much more important is the almost unalterable character of his ideas, which allows him to interpret Marxism in a particular way and, at the same time , adopt “external” influences. Only in this way will he be able to write his great essay on Nietzsche in 1908 and, in 1914, make some of the most intransigent Marxist manifestations.”

— Ernst Nolte, The Influence of Marx and Nietzsche on The Socialism of Young Mussolini

Should the blending of Marx and Nietzsche be deemed madness, then this state of madness would be recognized as “Fascism.” However, the very principles that laid the foundation for Fascism at the time of Mussolini’s nationalist shift are also what identified the future Duce as the first communist in Western Europe.

“If the reaction of the revolutionary wing of Marxism against the already more or less triumphant reformist tendency is described as communism, then it is justified to classify Mussolini as the first communist.”

— Ernst Nolte, The Influence of Marx and Nietzsche on The Socialism of Young Mussolini

The distinction between communists and socialists, particularly in terms of being viewed as mere reformists, stems from the essential role that violence is seen to play as a necessary means for ushering in a new societal order, that is, through revolution. Mussolini, known not only as a radical leader within the socialist party, comfortably utilizes the term “left” without reservation, in stark contrast to present-day impostors claiming to be Fascists or far-right individuals masquerading as such. In actuality, Mussolini’s political positioning leans towards the revolutionary left:

“There is an extreme left in German socialism — represented by the newspaper Leipziger Volkszeitung — that has many aspects in common with us.”

— Benito Mussolini, Opera Omnia

As Mussolini transitions explicitly into Fascism, his interpretation of nationalism undergoes a shift, not directly stemming from Nietzsche’s perspective, as Nietzsche himself holds a negative view towards nationalism. Despite this, the foundational elements of the initial fascist program document from May 13, 1919, clearly align with the extreme left. It embodies a form of national left, yet one that is radical and revolutionary in nature, paving the way for the emergence of revolutionary nationalism and a national-revolutionary ideology. In fascism, the concept of revolution originates from Marxist roots. The revolutionary aspect, distinct from the reactionary stance of the far right, maintains a connection to Marx within fascism, marking it as a form of Marxist heresy. The subsequent development of Mussolini’s post-Marxist nationalism involves the unique fusion of Fascist thought as an integration of Nietzschean ethics, a concept only subtly alluded to in Nietzsche’s own works.

While a detailed exploration of this topic will be further elucidated in Zeev Sternhell’s thesis on The Birth of Fascist Ideology, Nolte’s article alone underscores the intrinsic Marxist component of Fascism. Without Marx, Fascism cannot exist; it is not merely a product of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Forgetting this crucial insight risks a drift towards the right, thereby diluting the essence of Fascism. Contrary to facile beliefs, Fascism and communism were not diametric opposites. While pinpointing their precise relationship poses challenges, shared traits between the two ideologies have been identified by A. James Gregor.

“Fascism was the heir of a long intellectual tradition that found its origins in the ambiguous legacy left to revolutionaries in the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Fascism was, in a clear and significant sense, a Marxist heresy. It was a Marxism creatively developed to respond to the specific needs of an economically retarded national community condemned, as a proletarian nation, to compete with the more advanced plutocracies of its time for space, resources, and international stature.”

— A. James Gregor, Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship

Today, it’s widely accepted to question historical narratives, leading us to wonder: Were the early thinkers and political figures aware of the nuanced relationship between fascism and communism as they emerged and evolved in the early 20th century? Indeed, there were moments when some recognized that their shared goals far outweighed their ideological minutiae. By 1903, Arturo Labriola’s Avanguardia Socialista in Milan had become a pivotal platform for Italy’s syndicalist revolutionaries influenced by Sorel, who sought to challenge the prevailing reformist socialism. Esteemed figures such as Vilfredo Pareto and Benedetto Croce contributed to its discourse, setting the stage for a new wave of Sorelian theorists who would shape Italian radical thought for decades. They sought to craft a new socialist doctrine, viewing themselves as the legitimate successors to the Marxism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, with beliefs that diverged no more radically than those of Lenin’s interpretation of Marxism.

By 1904, a young Mussolini, then a socialist firebrand in Switzerland, began his association with Avanguardia Socialista, maintaining this connection for the next five years. His engagement with the journal’s syndicalist writers profoundly influenced his ideological and political path. Figures like A. O. Olivetti put forth the idea that in economically lagging conditions, socialists should harness nationalistic fervor to broaden their appeal. For Olivetti, both syndicalism and nationalism aimed to boost production significantly. He argued that as long as Italy’s economy was underdeveloped, the bourgeoisie was essential for laying the groundwork for a socialist upheaval. Olivetti envisioned a form of national socialism, asserting that in a struggling economy, national efforts were crucial for achieving the economic progress envisioned by classical Marxism.

Upon assuming the role of editor for the socialist publication Avanti! in December 1912, Mussolini brought on board a diverse group of contributors, including anarchists and staunch Marxists like Angelica Balabanoff, who served as his deputy editor. The editorial team, including Paolo Orano and syndicalists such as Sergio Panunzio, significantly influenced the paper’s socialist orientation. Mussolini didn’t stop there; he went on to launch and oversee Utopia from November 1913 until the end of 1914. This periodical became a gathering place for influential young socialists and syndicalist thinkers, playing a crucial role in shaping Mussolini’s ideological journey. In the years leading up to World War I, a number of syndicalists, Panunzio and Ottavio Dinale among them, viewed warfare as a means of societal progression. These figures, along with Mussolini, advocated for Italy’s military involvement in conflicts like the 1911 battle for Libya against the Ottomans and later in World War I.

This period marked a significant shift as many socialists transitioned into what would become Mussolini’s fascist movement, with syndicalists such as Panunzio, Olivetti, and Orano emerging as key thinkers within the ideology. By October 1914, Olivetti was articulating a vision of an Italian socialism enriched with nationalistic fervor in the pages of Pagine Libere, emphasizing its potential to unify Italy, boost production, and elevate the nation to global prominence. Over the following three years, through his contributions to L’Italia Nostra, Olivetti championed the idea of a nation as a collective entity that transcends class divisions, rallying individuals across societal lines toward shared historical objectives. In his view, patriotism and the revolutionary spirit of Italian socialism were not just compatible; they were intertwined.

By 1919, Mussolini was highlighting the downturn in economic productivity within Soviet Russia as evidence of its failure to fulfill its historical responsibilities. He speculated that the Bolsheviks would eventually need to dedicate themselves to national reconstruction and defense, essentially adopting a form of national socialism similar to the one articulated by Fascism’s syndicalist precursors. Mussolini foresaw the necessity for Lenin to seek the assistance of bourgeois professionals to mend Russia’s shattered economy, interpreting the Bolsheviks’ inability to recognize their revolutionary imperatives. He argued that Bolshevism needed to “tame” and engage the workforce in focused development efforts, a move he deemed inevitable since Marxism itself stipulated that socialism required a well-developed economic foundation. Given that Russia had not yet navigated through the capitalist phase of economic evolution, it lacked the essential conditions for a Marxist revolution to occur. According to Mussolini, Russia was as unprepared for socialism as Italy was.

In July 1920, Mussolini penned another critique of Lenin’s government, pointing out the irony that he would later construct his Fascist regime using the same principles he had criticized in the Bolshevik model. He contended that what they had established was:

“A State in the most concrete meaning of this word. A Government, composed of men who exercise power, imposing an iron discipline on individuals and groups and practicing “reaction” whenever necessary. In Lenin’s Russia,” there is but one authority: his. There is but one liberty: his. There is but one opinion: his. There is but one law: his. One must either submit or perish. With no room for individuality, the Soviets had created a “super State,” that swallows up and crushes the individual and governs his entire life. The most powerfully armed State, for domestic and foreign purposes, that exists in the world is precisely Russia. Whoever says State necessarily says the army, the police, the judiciary and the bureaucracy. The Russian State is the State par excellence [whose] proletariat, as in the old bourgeois regimes, obeys, works, and eats little or allows itself to be massacred.”

— Benito Mussolini quoted in Mussolini In The Making by Gaudens Megaro

He commended the Communist party, despite being a minority, for its capacity to rule “with absolute and unrestricted authority.” Dismissing the idea that genuine socialism had ascended to power, he determined:

“Lenin is an artist who has worked men, as other artists have worked marble or metals. But men are harder than stone and less malleable than iron. There is no masterpiece. The artist has failed. The task was superior to his capacities.”

— Benito Mussolini quoted in Mussolini In The Making by Gaudens Megaro

In the process of establishing his revolutionary governance, Lenin encountered numerous challenges that had been foreseen by syndicalists. Following his rise to power, he had pinned hopes on a German revolution to alleviate Soviet Russia’s predicaments. Meanwhile, the early proponents of Fascism were rallying for a domestic revolution, in contrast to the Bolsheviks’ aspirations for a worldwide revolt. By 1921, Lenin pivoted to introduce the New Economic Policy (NEP) as a substitute for the ideologically stringent, yet unsuccessful, War Communism strategy. Echoing the sentiments of Fascism, Lenin emphasized the importance of unifying society under “a single iron will,” and gradually acknowledged that the idea of the state withering away was far-off, affirming the necessity of the state and its coercive power.

Following Lenin’s demise in 1924, Stalin’s interpretation of Marxism in 1925, dubbed “Socialism in One Country,” essentially mirrored national socialism. Mussolini was wary, suspecting Stalin might be veering away from communist principles. This shift appeared to offer economic benefits to Italy, prompting Mussolini to see the logic in Italy manufacturing ships and aircraft for the Soviets in return for a significant portion of Italy’s oil needs. Mussolini also entertained the thought that Stalin could represent a continuation of Tsarist imperialism, a perspective Fascism might align with. In 1923, Mussolini speculated that Russia would abandon communism for a return to traditional imperialism with a Pan-Slavic character. Mussolini sought to persuade himself and others that Russian communism was becoming less revolutionary compared to Fascism, to the point where the distinctions between the two movements were becoming increasingly blurred.

“Tomorrow there will not be an imperialism with a socialist mark, but it [Russia] will return to the path of its old imperialism with a pan-Slavic mark.”

— Benito Mussolini quoted in Young Mussolini and The Intellectual Origins of Fascism by A. James Gregor

Even committed members of the Fascist party, such as Dino Grandi, who served as Mussolini’s foreign minister from 1928 to 1932, early on saw the similarities between Fascism and Lenin’s Bolshevism. Grandi, influenced in part by revolutionary syndicalism and having described the First World War as a class struggle among nations in 1914, by 1920 pointed out that socialists had misunderstood the essence of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. He viewed it as an underdeveloped, proletarian nation’s fight against more developed capitalist countries. The perspective that Fascism and Bolshevism shared common ground wasn’t exclusive to Fascists. Torquato Nanni, a revolutionary Marxist socialist who knew Mussolini early on, anticipated these parallels as early as 1922. He noted the economic bases shared by Fascism and Bolshevism, leading to similar strategies, tactics, and institutional characteristics in these mobilizing, revolutionary movements. Both movements, he observed, took on the bourgeois task of industrializing lagging economies and safeguarding the nation-state, deemed essential for progress. Furthermore, Leon Trotsky, a key figure in the October Revolution, stubbornly viewed Fascism as a mass movement emerging from capitalism’s failure. He dismissed any concept of a “national” communism but acknowledged a certain convergence between the movements.

“Stalinism and Fascism, despite a deep difference in social foundations, are symmetrical phenomena. In many of their features they show a deadly similarity. A victorious revolutionary movement in Europe would immediately shake not only fascism, but Soviet Bonapartism.”

— Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union And Where Is It Going?

He hesitated to align completely with his occasional collaborator, Bruno Rizzi, who posited that taking on similar developmental and self-sufficient roles would inevitably lead to social and ideological alignment. He expressed regret that what Fascism pursued deliberately, the Soviet Union ended up constructing unintentionally. In his view, the regimes of Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler, and even Roosevelt were moving towards a worldwide “bureaucratic collectivism,” representing a form of Jacobinism. Fascist ideologues concurred with the idea of such convergence. By 1925, Panunzio was pointing out the essential parallels between Fascism and Bolshevism. Fascists observed that the Soviet regime had established a militarized, authoritarian, anti-liberal state, which had effectively organized and disciplined the populace for the sake of ambitious domestic development. The central government was in charge of producing and distributing resources, defining and managing interests, and taking on ultimate educational responsibilities.

Therefore, as early Fascists were laying out the principles for an authoritarian, hierarchical, anti-liberal, and state-centered approach that emphasized mass mobilization and development under a charismatic leader, the Bolsheviks found themselves adopting a similar path. Both aimed to forge a modern, self-sufficient, industrial society that would secure political and economic sovereignty for previously underdeveloped national communities. Through forced industrialization and “State Capitalism,” the Soviets aimed to achieve the advantages of bourgeois modernization for Russia. In light of the necessary sacrifices, both communists and fascists used economic motivations as well as spectacles, rituals, ceremonies, and parades to rally their people, adding territorial expansion to illustrate a striking “systemic symmetry.”

From the outset of the October Revolution, the surge of literature on Bolshevism that swept through Italy indicated a profound and lasting interest in the Soviet venture. The dialogue that unfolded took fresh paths in 1922 and 1923 with the introduction of Lenin’s NEP, and again in 1928 with the start of collectivization and the First Five-Year Plan. Up until the mid-1930s, despite often harsh critiques, the Fascist media frequently showed an unexpected level of empathy towards the Soviet undertaking. This discourse did not truly conclude until the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941. While Western leftists at the time might have found Fascist critiques of Stalinist Russia to be overly harsh, in hindsight, they seem rather tempered. These critiques often came across as defensive, attempting to convince Italian workers of the superiority of Fascism.

Concerning Russia’s moral and intellectual “spiritual” existence, it drew the attention of several Italian writers, while others, possibly considering economic-political collaboration, examined the Soviet Union’s political geography and its various regions. Italians were acutely conscious of the forces that threatened to dismantle the unified front of the socialist republics. Some were also concerned about Russia and Bolshevism’s “expansionist,” “primitive,” “Asiatic” character, which they saw as a cultural and political threat to Europe, with Italy being its main defender. The political and philosophical dynamics of the power contest that ultimately placed Stalin in a position of dictatorial authority were not overlooked by Italian commentators.

A primary forum for this discussion was the pages of Critica Fascista, a notable critical journal representing Italy’s “corporativist left.” Its editor, Giuseppe Bottai, known as the “Crusader of the regime,” by the mid-1920s, was voicing the often-repeated assertion that Fascism and Bolshevism shared a common front against the bourgeois and plutocratic spirit. In 1930 and 1931, Critica Fascista published a series of articles later termed “Roma o Mosca?” In the spring of the former year, Bruno Spampanato interpreted Leninist violence as stemming from the “primitiveness of the Russian spirit,” viewing Russians as political “children.” He argued that Bolshevik ideology merely mirrored this immaturity. For instance, the government’s push against religion stemmed from the “naive unawareness of the revolution’s early stages.” He predicted, just as Robespierre’s anti-religious policies evolved into Napoleon’s acceptance of religion, the Bolsheviks would eventually moderate their stance on religious hostility.

Spampanato noted that Stalin, in carrying on Lenin’s legacy, couldn’t overlook the “necessity” of adapting. New socio-economic classes were emerging within the proletariat, and the campaign against the kulaks in rural areas was losing momentum. He saw the sequence of war, revolution, and civil war as Russia’s Nietzschean transformation, emerging from chaos and death. However, the slower pace of development under the Tsarist regime meant that the Bolshevik revolution was marked by greater violence compared to other European revolutions. The delay in fostering a national consciousness in Tsarist Russia, coupled with the attempt by Leninism to forge a national identity, was further complicated by ideological burdens weighing down the Bolsheviks. Highlighting Fascism as the pinnacle of political evolution, Spampanato suggested that, as of 1930, Russia found itself in a standoff with Fascist democracy. Nevertheless, he identified a potential link that could, theoretically, unite the two.

“Not fearing any example because they are solidly attached to the vitality of their historical experience, Fascists can fasten on to some fundamental points of esteem for the Bolshevik experience…. we dare to say that Bolshevism in Russia is the prelude to Fascism.”

— Bruno Spampanato, Equazioni Rivoluzionarie: Dal Bolscevismo al Fascismo

The debate within Critica Fascista truly gained momentum about eighteen months later. Sergio Panunzio, strengthening his argument with a recent declaration from the Duce that Italy’s trade relations with the USSR surpassed those with any other nation, refuted the notion of any economic conflict between Rome and Moscow.

“Therefore, if we put ourselves exclusively on an economic ground, we arrive to the “absurdity” that fascism opposes communism. We also come to the point of not being able any more to discern a difference. On the contrary, we glimpse a balancing synthesis—the diagonal of the historical contact of two great forces and of two great modern revolutions: Communism and Fascism—Rome and Moscow.”

— Sergio Panunzio, La Fine di un Regno

The ideological distinctions between Fascism and Bolshevism were stark, with the former being characterized by its focus on spiritual values, willpower, and national identity, while the latter was seen as centered around materialism and industrialism. This fundamental opposition between the ideologies of Moscow and Rome was described as deep and unbridgeable, particularly in the realms of spirituality, morality, and religion, setting the stage for an unending conflict between the two. Despite these profound differences, there were instances where Italians could envision working alongside the Bolsheviks in a practical manner without compromising their core spiritual beliefs. This possibility sparked a vigorous debate in the pages of Critica Fascista, initiated by an article from a former syndicalist. Riccardo Fiorini contended that the economic disparities between communism and Fascism weren’t primarily about the divide between private and state control of production. Instead, he highlighted that Fascism’s approach to production was inherently nationalistic, unlike communism, which he believed was on a path toward making production international. Even so, Fiorini anticipated that the economic methodologies of communism would gradually align more closely with those of fascism.

On spiritual issues, Fiorini challenged the clear-cut distinction made by Panunzio between Fascism and communism. He was skeptical of the Soviet claim to materialism and noted that some aspects of Tsarist Russia’s family and religious traditions deserved to be eradicated. Furthermore, Fiorini saw potential for spiritual collaboration between the two systems, as both opposed liberalism and democracy, arguing that they shared a common goal of establishing a new order and predicted communism would eventually converge with Fascism. Shortly thereafter, Mario Rivoire lent his support to Panunzio’s viewpoint that the real divergence between Rome and Moscow wasn’t economic in nature, describing Fascism’s approach to physical matters as more nuanced. He disagreed with Fiorini, emphasizing that the key difference was metaphysical, with communism focusing on material aspects and Fascism on the spiritual. Rivoire criticized the initial discussion in Critica Fascista for lacking clarity and highlighted the challenge of reconciling Soviet actions with their rhetoric. He found guidance in a speech by Mussolini from 1921, which helped him navigate this dilemma.

“I recognize that between us and the communists there are no political affinities, but there are intellectual affinities. We, as you (the communists) think it is necessary to have a centralized and unitary State which imposes on all the unity of an iron discipline. There is one difference. You arrive at this conclusion through the concept of classes, and we come to it through the concept of the nation.”

— Benito Mussolini quoted in Mussolini and The Legacy of Revolutionary Socialism by Domenico Settembrini

For Mario Rivoire, the central issue boiled down to this: was the primary focus on class or nation? In Rome’s perspective, the state served the interests of the nation, whereas in Moscow’s view, it was dedicated to serving a specific class.

“In other words, for Moscow, all the State is of the party, while for Rome, all, including the party, is of the State.”

— Mario Rivoire, Affinità ed antitesi fra Roma e Mosca

Rivoire was skeptical about the potential for a merger between these two ideologies any time soon. Other commentators within the Fascist movement turned their attention to different issues, including concerns over Russia’s historical threat to Europe. Alberto Luchini, for instance, criticized what he perceived as a growing fondness for Moscow, challenging the idea that recent years of positive relations indicated any deep-seated compatibility between the two regimes. He argued that such views overlooked centuries of anti-Italian sentiment from Russia, highlighting conflicts from the late 18th century through to World War I where Russia’s actions were counter to Italian interests. Despite brief periods of cooperation, Luchini maintained that the fundamental stance of Fascism was against both Slavic and Bolshevik influences, emphasizing the distinct origins of the two ideologies.

In the same vein, Spampanato revisited the discussion, proposing a shift in the way the issue was usually framed from a choice between “Rome or Moscow?” to considering “Rome and Moscow, or old Europe?” He pointed out that France, representing old Europe with its liberal and democratic values, was opposed to both Rome and Moscow, and hinted at Germany’s pivotal geographic and potentially ideological position between the two. Luciano Ingianni also contributed to the debate, critiquing the views of both Panunzio and Fiorini. He argued that the pursuit of materialism did not fundamentally differentiate Bolshevism from Fascism, suggesting that the real divergence lay in the source of authority — state vs class. Ingianni also touched upon economic differences but agreed with Rivoire that these were not sufficient to define a clear opposition. He speculated that the key distinction might instead relate to the contrast between class and corporate ideologies, or between national and international visions, even suggesting a racial dimension to the debate by contrasting Mediterranean spirituality with Marxist-Leninist materialism.

Spampanato, in what turned out to be the concluding argument of this round of discussions in early 1932, revisited the nature of the relationship between the Bolshevik and Fascist State, aiming to clarify the true nature of their connection and differences.

“There is no fascist international. There is, instead, a universality of fascism in that the modern revolution is developed and is destined to be realized according to a few political and economic postulates, according to the few governing ideas characteristic of the new Italy. Fascism is Italian and universal: two conditions of the same reality. Fascism is born in Italy, but it is born for the world.

— Bruno Spampanato, Universalità di ottobre: Dove arriva lo Stato

The ideology of Fascism aimed for expansion through imperialism, sharing a global outlook with Marxism. Despite the Totalitarian nature of the Bolshevik state, it did not genuinely embody a class dictatorship. Spampanato confidently believed that Stalinism would eventually converge with Fascism. Throughout the 1930s, discussions in the Critica Fascista echoed themes reminiscent of pre-World War I Italian syndicalists. By 1937, Agostino Nasti viewed Stalinism as a distinct political strategy that rallied the Russian populace towards nationalist-driven industrial and economic growth. This approach also aimed to captivate international audiences by appealing to their desire for social justice, while simultaneously pursuing an expansionist and imperialist agenda. Fascist critique of Bolshevism evolved from an understanding that the Soviet regime had failed to adapt to the modern world’s challenges, persisting in its promotion of outdated internationalist and anti-state rhetoric despite a clear shift in its practices. Fascists like Nasti observed with satisfaction that the Stalinist regime had moved away from classical Marxism, incorporating and altering Leninist concepts. The fervent opposition to religion, militarism, and nationalism, once the hallmark of the socialism that Fascism opposed, seemed to dissipate.

Fascists focused on how these internal shifts within the Soviet Union influenced international dynamics. They believed Stalin’s reforms in the mid-1930s fundamentally altered the foundational principles of the Russian revolution, aligning more closely with the ideologies underpinning Mussolini’s Fascism. The debate, despite often lacking in detail and filled with broad assertions, managed to capture a spectrum of Fascist perspectives, revealing a surprising openness to the idea of ideological alignment, or at the very least, to political and economic collaboration. Despite the hostilities of the Italo-Abyssinian War and the Spanish Civil War, Italian attitudes towards communism were not irrevocably hardened until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. This openness suggests that despite their ideological posturing, there was a philosophical willingness among Italians to consider cooperation with the Soviets.

Beyond the scope of the Critica Fascista discussions, throughout the early 1930s, numerous Italian writers delved into the examination of Soviet society, economy, and governance. Their analyses offered Italians comprehensive insights, enabling informed decisions regarding potential collaborations with the USSR across various domains, including economic, diplomatic, or military engagements. Tomaso Napolitano emerged as a particularly diligent investigator, thoroughly exploring the challenging circumstances faced by workers, families, creatives, and individuals who found themselves entangled in the Stalinist legal framework.

“I read these documents through: they are chiefly extracts from Soviet newspapers which contain facts of incredible misery, abjection, and an appalling lack of humanity…. [these facts] are the most sure expression of a decayed world, of a civilization which is walking centuries backward.”

— Tomaso Napolitano, Maternità e infanzia nell’U.R.S.S

Despite the critical tone of Napolitano’s writings, his articles were consistently well-researched and based on publicly available Soviet sources. Napolitano and other Fascists believed that Stalinist Marxism was an extension of pre-World War I revolutionary syndicalism, arguing that the developmental challenges faced by Soviet Russia necessitated the adoption of Fascist-like institutions and organizational structures. The Soviet Union’s Five Year Plans captivated Italians, leading them to speculate whether Stalin’s regime was leaning towards a Corporatist State Capitalism. For instance, Italian engineer Gaetano Ciocca, who contributed to the construction of the Kaganovich ball bearing factory, offered a detailed critique of the economic and political achievements and shortcomings of the First Five Year Plan, highlighting the stark contrasts between Soviet Communism and Italian Corporatism. Mussolini lauded Ciocca’s insights as representing “objective reality,” whereas Moscow condemned the publication as an anti-Soviet act. On the eve of the plant’s inauguration, Pravda countered with an article, purportedly from a worker, asserting that Russians had no need to learn technical organization from foreigners, Italians included. In response, the Italian chargé d’affaires in Moscow, Berardis, reminded the Soviet foreign ministry of the long history of Italian technical assistance to Russia, dating back to the era of Ivan III. Despite acknowledging the accuracy of Ciocca’s observations, Berardis noted the Soviet reaction was to be expected.

The situation was further complicated when Engineer Secondo Marocco, leading the Italian engineers in Moscow, lodged a protest with the plant director, who swiftly offered a heartfelt apology. The following day, Izvestia published an article by the apologetic director, commending the Italian contributions to the ball bearing industry. During the factory’s opening ceremony, attended by notable Soviet leaders and named after L. M. Kaganovich, the director publicly acknowledged the Italian engineers’ role in advancing the industry and his factory. A plaque installed at the factory and a celebratory banquet underscored the Italo-Soviet collaboration, leading Marocco to conclude that the critical Pravda piece did not reflect official Kremlin stance. Marocco’s efforts were eventually recognized with an award from the government, affirming the value of international cooperation.

Yet, the controversy was far from settled. In November, just as Italy and the USSR were gearing up for Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov’s upcoming visit to Rome in December, Ciocca’s candid press interview caused a stir in the Kremlin. Rome’s formal dismissal of Ciocca’s critiques did little to mollify the irritated Soviet officials. The Soviet envoy, Potemkin, conveyed to the Italian Undersecretary of State Suvich that Ciocca, having been removed from his job due to alleged incompetence, had sought to stay in the USSR for further work but was denied. Potemkin suggested that Ciocca’s actions were driven by personal grievances and urged the Italian government to publicly distance itself from the engineer’s disparaging remarks to facilitate a smoother visit for Litvinov. Following Litvinov’s trip, Pravda once more criticized Ciocca’s publication while lauding the advancements of the Soviet ball bearing sector.

In 1933, Mussolini also expressed admiration for Renzo Bertoni’s work, Il Trionfo del Fascismo Nell’U.R.S.S., which, like Ciocca, painted a grim picture of life in the Soviet Union during the Second Five Year Plan, describing widespread despair, hunger, and governmental failures. Bertoni asserted that both Fascism and communism aimed for similar outcomes but only Fascism could rescue Russia economically, spiritually, and socially in preparation for future conflicts. He argued that intensive development necessitated the adoption of Fascism’s key features, regardless of the stated ideology. Mussolini wholeheartedly endorsed the view that Russia’s path to redemption was through embracing Fascist principles. Around the same period, Il Piccolo issued a warning about the global spread of communism, describing it as a Russian phenomenon. Rodolfo Mosca questioned Russia’s cultural alignment but saw Italy as a potential mediator between Russia and the rest of the world. Ottavio Dinale, despite recognizing the fundamental differences between Bolshevism and Fascism, acknowledged that both shared significant, formidable commonalities in their origins and methods. Four years later, during the Spanish Civil War, Eurgeio Coselschi vehemently denounced these comparisons, taking a stand against such interpretations.

“Bolshevism is not European and neither is it Asiatic. It is outside humanity, it is beneath the thought of man, of human civilization, of all the eternal and immutable laws of our life.”

— Eurgeio Coselschi, Tre Bandiere sul Mondo

In the early 1930s, a broad spectrum of Italians, including engineers, technicians, businessmen, merchant mariners, cultural delegates, artists, and even tourists, ventured extensively throughout the USSR. This was notable given the tumultuous environment of the early planning period and the typically secretive nature of the Soviet Union. It seemed the Kremlin was prepared to face potential embarrassment from revelations about the tough realities of Soviet life, in exchange for courting Italy as a potential ally against the threats posed by Germany and Japan. These Italian visitors became a critical conduit of insights for both the Italian government and its citizens, with their accounts adding a layer of tangible experiences to the discussions on the true character of the Bolshevik regime.

These firsthand accounts from “civilian” observers significantly enhanced Italy’s understanding of Stalinist Russia. Even more crucially, Italian diplomats inundated their foreign ministry with detailed dispatches that painted a vivid picture of the Soviet Union, covering a wide range of issues from the purges and trials to religious oppression, economic struggles, famines, military unrest, and the dire living conditions across the country. While these reports occasionally acknowledged Soviet achievements, the predominantly grim portrayal they offered was startling. This grim portrayal not only highlighted the daunting internal challenges faced by the Soviet Union but also raised questions about its political and military stability. For instance, the morale within the Red Army was reported to have severely deteriorated following collectivization efforts. Italian diplomats, keen observers of these developments, refuted any suggestions that Marshal Voroshilov had instigated the widespread discontent within the Red Army. One particular report from an Italian source detailed a Communist party meeting held at the end of February 1931, shedding light on the internal dynamics and challenges.

“[The] head of political education in the Red Army, delivered a powerful speech. He declared that the situation created because of the policy of “liquidating the kulaks” and of agricultural collectivisation to the bitter end, demanded by Stalin, had given rise to an incurable discontent amongst the soldiers.  In large part the sons of peasants, they did not conceal their resentment of the Soviet Government. Thus either the system changed or they would no longer be able to count on the Red Army. “

— Jonathan Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930-33: The Impact of The Depression

Despite Stalin’s silence during the meeting, he swiftly called upon the Politburo to discuss the criticisms raised. The outcome revealed that seven members opposed the dictator’s strategy, while only Stalin and Molotov stood in support. Subsequently, Stalin requested a twenty-four-hour period for decision-making. During this time frame, he independently crafted the renowned “Dizzy with Success” address, effectively halting the aggressive push for collectivization. Even as tensions escalated in the late 1930s, many Fascists maintained the belief that Italy and the Soviet Union did not fundamentally clash ideologically. In 1935, amidst strained relations between Germany and Italy, Mussolini engaged in a conversation with Ernst Niekisch, a German National Bolshevik known for his opposition to Hitler. It was during this exchange that Mussolini shared one of the most profound statements I’ve encountered.

“Isn’t it true that one must go through the school of Marxism to acquire a true understanding of political realities? Those who have not passed through the school of historical materialism will remain mere ideologists.”

— Benito Mussolini quoted in Niekisch and Mussolini by Ernst Niekisch

Amidst the politically charged Spanish Civil War in 1938, Mussolini went so far as to brand Stalin as a “fascist.” This characterization was echoed by Sergio Panunzio, who pointed out that Stalin’s regime exhibited Fascist-like traits, despite the communist leader’s initial stance against nationalism. As the world teetered on the brink of World War II, observers drew parallels between Bolshevism and Fascism, particularly in their approaches to national modernization and industrialization. Italy conducted thorough assessments of the Soviet Union, focusing on its economic policies and the outcomes of the Five-Year Plans. This analysis provided Italy with valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system, hinting at the potential for a strategic alliance with Moscow.

Italy was only deterred from pursuing a closer relationship with the Soviet Union due to the challenges posed by Stalin’s policies, internal unrest, and concerns about Stalin’s reliability in upholding international agreements. The idea of an alliance between Italy and the Soviet Union persisted until the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinian War in 1935. Mussolini’s decision not to align with the Soviet Union was guided more by strategic considerations than ideological differences. The League of Nations’ sanctions against Italy, supported by Moscow during the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, and the manipulation of the Spanish Civil War by both countries marked a significant turning point. The decline in relations between Rome and Moscow from 1924 to late 1935 was driven more by strategic interests than ideological divergence, with ideology often serving as a secondary rationale for political decisions shaped by strategic concerns. Prior to their falling out, Italy and the Soviet Union had viewed ideology as both a potential foundation for cooperation and a stumbling block.