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One of the most fascinating documents I’ve read in recent months is the proudly-titled “Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. Eighteenth Congress. First session on the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1947.”

The so-called Subcommittee on Deficiencies consisted of Chairman John Taber (New York), Clarence Cannon (Missouri), Francis Case (South Dakota), Albert J. Engel (Michigan), Frank B. Keefe (Wisconsin), John H. Kerr (North Carolina), George H. Mahon (Texas), Karl Stefan (Nebraska), and Richard B. Wigglesworth (Massachusetts), and it was tasked with the eternal job of governments everywhere: Finding out where the money went and how to get some more.

1947 was, frankly, a very bad year for the federal purse. The initial euphoria of having won the war had abated, and in addition to the expenditures at home there was the big overseas elephant in the room: Japan, Korea, Germany, and Austria. Winning a war is great, I guess, but it comes with very expensive responsibilities, as the members of the Subcommittee were about to find out.

In Germany, this was the height of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067, based on the allegedly discarded Morgenthau Plan. (How enlightening that Wikipedia, when you start typing in either name, shows “Post WWII destabilization plan for Germany” — emphasis mine — as a quick summary.)

It was then almost two years after the end of the war in Europe, and everything critics of the Morgenthau Plan had predicted had come to pass. Germans, unable to produce goods for export because of the destruction or dismemberment of their industrial plants, had no money to import food. Since the same factories that produced fertilizer could also produce war materiel, they had been shut down, with disastrous effects on local food production. On top of that, large parts of the best agricultural land in Germany had been given to Poland. Germany’s fishing fleet was only allowed to operate near the coast and only in small boats. Germans were quite literally starving to death under Western Allied occupation.

The members of the Subcommittee, far removed from the events, were given a rough wake-up call on March 14, 1947 by Dennis A. FitzGerald, Secretary General of the International Emergency Food Council, who had accompanied Herbert Hoover on his fact-finding mission to Europe. The minutes of the meeting are a fascinating read. The longer FitzGerald spoke, the more the Subcommittee realized how bad things actually were — and how much Morgenthau’s policy of turning Germany into a “pastoral” state was costing the American taxpayer.

FitzGerald began with overall numbers in the “combined United States-United Kingdom zone”: 43,000,000 inhabitants as compared to around 34,000,000 before the war. (Most refugees and expellees from the former German eastern provinces had ended up in that zone.) Even before the war, the combined zone had never been self-supporting in food. Large quantities of grain, potatoes, fats and oils, and meat had been imported from eastern Germany and Poland. By 1947, food production in the zone had decreased by about one-third, in part because of a smaller crop acreage, but mainly because of a lack of fertilizers.

The ration in the United States-United Kingdom zone was at the time a theoretical 1,550 calories per day for the “normal consumer” — the consumer who did not do any work that entitled him or her to get supplemental rations. “It represents the housewife, the unemployed, the white-collar worker –that group of people that do not do any extra physical work.” Note that those calories were theoretical; it didn’t mean that the population actually received that much in real life. When there was nothing at hand to provide those calories with, the ration was much lower –and this happened frequently. Not without reason a protest sign at one of the 1947 food riots in Germany read, “We don’t want calories, we want bread!” The Subcommittee meeting also took place right on the heels of the exceptionally long and cold winter of 1946-47, which became known in Germany as the “hunger winter.”

Under these circumstances, and going by 1,550 calories per normal consumer plus supplements for heavy workers, Dennis FitzGerald told the Subcommittee that, for the period from January to July of that year, grain import requirements would need to be 2,505,000 tons — just in grains, in just two occupation zones. To a stunned Subcommittee, FitzGerald then went on to list all the other foodstuffs that needed to be shipped over to Germany — and being paid for by the American and British taxpayers. It is here that the minutes are starting to get amusing as well as informative.

The CHAIRMAN. Does not Germany have any fishing industry of its own, especially that part of Germany in the United States and United Kingdom zone?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes, sir; it does have a fishing industry. It was, of course, pretty badly damaged by the war, but there are two problems in the fishing industry in Germany that I could mention. First, there is a provision in the Potsdam Agreement for limitation of the size of vessels that Germany can build or buy. The limitation on size is such that the Germans cannot fish very far away from the German coast. They cannot go out to some of the best fishing grounds. There is another difficulty; namely, that at the present time the Germans are not permitted to fish within 50 miles of the Scandinavian coast with their smaller vessels and the best fishing grounds are, of course, within that distance.

The CHAIRMAN. Why are they not allowed to fish there?

Mr. FITZGERALD. It was an agreement that was reached at the time of the German collapse, sir, that Germans would not be permitted to fish within 50 miles of these coasts. I personally feel that it is an unnecessary restriction now. . .. Representations, I understand, are being made to get that restriction removed so that the Germans can catch more fish for themselves. They have the seamen; they have the interest and the ability to catch more fish if the restrictions on their operations could be removed. . . .

Mr. ENGEL. Are we buying this fish from Denmark and Holland and paying them for it and feeding the Germans with it?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes; the United States and the British, together.

The CHAIRMAN. That means that we are paying for it.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand that the Germans are effectively prohibited from fishing first because of the Potsdam limitation on the size of the boats that they may have and secondly because of the restriction of the area within which they may fish?

Mr. FITZGERALD. They are not completely restricted, sir. They are catching quite a large volume of fish, but they could catch considerably more if it were not for those restrictions. . . .

Mr. ENGEL. How much do you think they could supply if there were no restrictions?

Mr. FITZGERALD. They could catch over half a million tons. My remembrance is that the German fish catch is in the neighborhood of 300,000 tons, or something like that, now.

Mr. KEEFE. They could pretty nearly double that if these restrictions were removed?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And have plenty of fish for their requirements? . . .

Mr. FITZGERALD. They could help themselves appreciably. Of course, the ration of fresh fish is very small now, and undoubtedly would be greatly increased if they could catch their own fish supply. It runs at the rate of 600 grams for 28 days. That is all that their ration on fish now amounts to.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any logic at all to the restriction?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Not in my opinion, sir.

Logic, thy name is Morgenthau. And White. And Kaufman.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no fish requirements on the part of the Scandinavian countries that would be interfered with by German fishing operations, is there?

Mr. FITZGERALD. No; as a matter of fact, the Scandinavian fishing fleets are not running, not fishing every day in the week now, because there is not a market, a need in their own countries for all the fish they can catch. Of course, what the Scandinavian countries want to do, sir, is to operate their fishing fleet at capacity and sell all their surplus to Germany for either American dollars or British sterling.

Mr. ENGEL. Have us pay for it.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes, sir.

You can almost see the Subcommittee members seething by this point. But hey, it’s just good business, right?

The discussion then turned to other food sources, and Congressman Keefe proved himself quite informed in certain matters:

The CHAIRMAN. Cannot the Germans raise potatoes to take care of themselves? Do they not have enough land available for that purpose?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Unquestionably, Mr. Chairman, there is enough land to grow all the potatoes the Germans could eat.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they being restricted on what they can raise?

Mr. FITZGERALD. No; they are being encouraged to raise all the potatoes they possibly can have any use for. . . . The difficulty this year has been, Mr. Chairman, that last fall the potato crop was below normal, first because of poor weather; and second because of lack of fertilizer; and third, because of their poor seed. They have run out of replacement seed stock and they are having to plant diseased and poor seed stock, which has reduced their yields. . . .

Mr. KEEFE. Information has been given to me that one of the chief problems over there is the lack of proper fertilizer and that with all the seed in the world they will not be able to produce a satisfactory crop unless they can get fertilizer, which is so badly needed.

Mr. FITZGERALD. That is correct information, sir. . . . The seed alone will make an appreciable improvement. It will not make as much improvement as could result if there were adequate supplies of fertilizer available. There is a very, very serious deficiency in the fertilizer supplies available for Germany, and for people in this country, and for people almost everywhere, but particularly a serious shortage in Germany.

Mr. KEEFE. Is it a fact — this further information was given to me that the destruction of the heavy industry, the steel industry particularly in Germany, has taken away from the country a very large source of supply of elementary fertilizer? Is that correct?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes, sir; 40 percent of the phosphates that were produced in Germany prior to the war were a byproduct of the steel industry.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is gone now, is it not?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Substantially so.

Mr. KEEFE. As a part of this pastoral program under the Quebec Agreement.

Aha! Congressman Keefe and his source of information were on to something here! “This pastoral program under the Quebec Agreement” was, of course, the Morgenthau Plan. Winston Churchill, initially opposed to its terms, had been strong-armed at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944 to sign it after all in exchange for continued US Lend-Lease to Britain.

Congressman Cannon, however, was more interested in the bottom line:

Mr. CANNON. To what extent must the German food supply be supplemented by imports prior to the next harvest? . . . Does that mean it is required for bare subsistence; that actual famine will follow if it is not provided; or does that mean that it brings it up to a more humanitarian standard of living?

Mr. FITZGERALD. . . . [These] imports are what are needed to provide the bare minimum for feeding the German population without a sharp increase in death rates, in tuberculosis, in diseases or related physical conditions that go along with malnutrition.

Mr. CANNON. . . . Your official interest in this matter is solely concerned with the provision of sufficient food to bring these people through. You do not take into consideration the motives or objectives or policies, present or future, but does your service in any way dovetail with the theory that the German people should be preserved [!!!] and a buffer state should be maintained there to insure future peace in Europe?

Mr. FITZGERALD. . . . I feel that the real importance of this matter is because Germany is what I call the economic heart of Europe. The whole of Europe is never going to get back on its economic feet without German coal, without German steel, without German potash, and without many other things it is in a position to produce.

Mr. CANNON. If I may interrupt, just at that point, could we not turn those industries over to the Russians and rehabilitate the economy of the Continent just as effectively as it would be done by the Germans?

Mr. FITZGERALD. That is a pure matter of opinion, sir; and my opinion is “No.” . . .

Mr. MAHON. This whole question bothers all of us, I think, all of the American people. The ideal situation would be if every taxpaying American, and that would include all of us, could go into these places and actually see these conditions and learn the facts and take action based on personal observation. You have made more of a study of it than the rest of us, and you have seen more of it than the rest of us. We cannot all see these conditions, and we do not know what to believe at times. Are you absolutely convinced that if we do not appropriate large sums of money [to] feed the people in the occupied area over there that conditions approaching starvation and death will prevail?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes, sir. In Germany this last year, the United States and the United Kingdom zone of Germany produced around 1,000 or 1,100 calories of food per person in those two zones. That, I think, any doctor or nutritionist will tell you is fairly rapid starvation. The 1,500 calorie level which is being maintained in Germany is the minimum that any reputable health authority will say it is possible to sustain life on for any period of time, and a level in which the oncoming generation will be very, very much poorer off than the present generation.

Mr. MAHON. Then you insist that it is either spending our millions in helping to sustain these people on the one hand, or it is not doing so and permitting them to die of starvation or to contract diseases that will lead to death?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes. I can honestly say, sir, that it is either this minimum 1,550 calorie ration, or conditions of malnutrition which would result in the most extreme conditions of disease and death. . . .

Mr. CANNON. In supplying this money to feed Germany and to ward off certain famine would we be acting from purely altruistic and humanitarian motives and purposes, or would we be to any extent at the same time serving our own national business interests?

Mr. FITZGERALD. We would be economically making a big contribution to the latter, sir, because Europe cannot recover without a reasonable level of physical and economic production in Germany, and if Europe cannot recover we are not going to be able to sell to them.

That’s cold, but if it helps to sell the idea of humanitarian aid to Germany, I’m not complaining. Congressman Wigglesworth then asked the big question:

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. Have you not made, or can you not give us a dollar-and-cent estimate of what that foodstuff program that you recommend would amount to?

Mr. FITZGERALD. . . . The total cost of the imported supplies required for consumption — until mid-August is around $338,000,000.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean from when to when?

Mr. FITZGERALD. From January 1 through deliveries for consumption up to August 15. . . . Now, half of that the United Kingdom pay for. . . .

Mr. ENGEL. That is your total cost for all Germany between January 1 and August 15 in the British and American zones?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGEL. For foodstuffs alone?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes.

Victory was supposed to look a little different, eh?

A novel approach, however, was then taken by South Dakota. Congressman Case surprised FitzGerald with a proposal:

Mr. CASE. You are aware of the fact, of course, that Congress has authorized the continuance for this year of the farm-labor program, and has authorized $20,000,000 for that purpose to bring in Mexicans and others principally to work in the vegetable and beet industry. Would it not be possible to bring some of those sugar-beet workers and farmers from Germany who would be just as good or better employees than the Mexicans and save both ways?

Mr. FITZGERALD. That is a very interesting suggestion. Of course, the travel cost would be larger, the cost of moving them would be larger.

Mr. CASE. Yes, but the ships move both ways.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think you could get all the recruits you wanted.

Mr. CASE. The boats go over there and take food over, and unless they have some exports over there to send back they certainly could put in some people and bring them back.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes.

Mr. CASE. I had a telegram from sugar-beet growers in certain districts stating that they would prefer German sugar-beet workers to the type of labor that has been brought in.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I would suggest that it would be desirable to go a little slowly on taking sugar-beet workers out of Germany because they have a sugar-beet program there.

Mr. CASE. That is probably true, but there certainly must be enough population there that could adapt itself to this type of labor so that they could handle it.

Mr. FITZGERALD. There is a big population there that I am sure could be adapted to it.

Mr. CASE. Would you explore that a little with the people in the Department of Agriculture who are administering that labor program and then let me know what you find out about it?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes, sir.

South Dakota farmers had obviously observed German POWs working on their land and liked what they’d seen. In 1945-46, they had even tried to keep their POWs around for the 1946 harvest.

Since Germans in 1947 were not allowed to emigrate, Congressman Case was tasked with finding out whether an arrangement similar to the Bracero Program could be made. I have unfortunately been unable to find out how the story ended. Nothing came of the proposal; that much is certain. I suspect it was denied because of the ongoing search for war criminals in Germany. Once the restrictions were lifted, quite a number of young German men who saw no future in their homeland emigrated, mainly to Canada but also to the United States and Australia. (One of my uncles joined them in the 1950s, but that is a different tale.)

After Dennis FitzGerald’s report, the Subcommittee was confronted with the situation in Austria, which makes for hilarious reading of its own. (“What kind of setup is that? Is it something that is gotten up on too liberal a scale?”) If you have the time and the interest, read the full document — it’s a whopping 920 pages long and includes domestic as well as international matters, but despite all the numbers and lists it never gets boring. It’s a fascinating window into a very underreported time in US history.