Iranian State media has confirmed the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi May 19th, following the crash of his helicopter over Iranian Azerbaijan. Raisi was returning from a ceremony inaugurating the joint Iranian-Azerbaijani Qiz Qalasi dam project. Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian has also reportedly died in the crash—but Iran has no shortage of capable diplomats, and his death certainly doesn’t rise to the level of global geopolitical significance.

Iranian media initially held out some hope for a rescue, but the region’s rugged terrain, dense fog and cold temperatures stymied efforts to locate the crash site in a timely manner. Whether or not Raisi died on impact holds little geopolitical importance. Likewise, I’d argue, his death by itself does not present a significant loss of capability or capacity for the Iranian regime.

But this is Iran we’re talking about. Iranians’ flair for the dramatic and gold chandeliers aside, Iran and its bad behavior are a favorite topic for the world’s politicians and media outlets. Recent tensions between Israel and Iran have only exacerbated what would be the normal run of rumors at a time like this. So, we’re left with two big questions:

-Did someone kill the Iranian president?

-What’s next for the corridors of power in Iran?

Raisi, a hardline clerical figure, gained significant notoriety for overseeing the harsh crackdown of Iran’s 2022 protest movement. He is one in a line of presidents who have been at the helm of the Iranian government since the founding leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died in 1989.

Plenty of people within the country and especially outside of Iran’s borders are likely toasting his demise. Wanting him dead and having the capability to do so are two entirely different things, however. Iran’s various separatist movements are highly unlikely to have the sophistication and technology to correctly identify and shoot down Raisi’s helicopter, especially given weather conditions. (Raisi was travelling with other officials and at least three other helicopters at the time of the crash.) So too are regional terror groups, like ISIS-Khorasan, unlikely culprits.

Tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan have only risen in recent years as the Aliyev regime has grown closer to Israel (as well as Turkey and the West). But despite Baku’s recent military successes against Armenia, I really doubt Azerbaijan would shoot down the Iranian president.

Which brings us to the question everyone really has on their mind: Did the Israelis do it?

The short answer? I don’t know. And likely neither does anyone else. I might be wrong here, but I also don’t think the Israelis have a lot to gain right now by shooting down the sitting president of a regional adversary. The aftermath would be incredibly ugly and would do little to change Israel’s current risk profile: love him or hate him (most people probably hated him), Raisi is not the center of power inside Iran.

Since 1989, current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has managed the convoluted and often-times competing factions of the various religious, political, and economic centers of Iranian power. He is old and, if we believe well-sourced Israeli and American intelligence figures who leak to the media, been dying for the past 20 years. (He’s 85 and we’re more likely to get there sooner than not…)

Did the Ayatollah get rid of Raisi? Probably not. Many Iran watchers would argue that Raisi was on the short list of clerics likely to eventually replace the current Supreme Leader. Was it someone within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps? Another political rival? Not likely. While Raisi was often mentioned as a significant obstacle to nuclear talks with the rest, no one figure in Iran has enough veto power over a policy point (and perhaps not even the Supreme Leader) to stymie a nuclear détente with the West. And Iran was scheduled to have presidential elections in a year. There are certainly less… fraught ways to get rid of a president in Iran.

The simplest explanation would be that the president’s plane simply had an unfortunate accident at a very inconvenient time. Most of Iran’s aircraft are Franken-zombie constructs, a product of successful Western sanctions limiting Iran’s ability to get new technology and parts. Pre-1979 Western equipment is kept alive with a mix of indigenous knock-off components and whatever schlock can get in from Russia and China. Russian and Chinese aircraft and parts are often second-or-third-hand purchases from intermediaries looking to avoid sanctions. And then there’s Brazil: Embraer is no slouch when it comes to small and medium-sized planes, to be sure. And Iran and former/current Brazilian President Lula da Silva are old friends. But not even the President of Brazil can bend US sanctions to his will; Iran has seen its plans to buy a fleet of second-hand jets stall for years as Washington’s most formidable lawyers and accountants work tirelessly to keep the planes grounded.

Bad weather, bad fog, and bad parts make for good chances for an accident. We might learn that more nefarious things were afoot, but there’s certainly not a lot of reason now to jump to that conclusion.

Which brings us to our second question: what comes next for Iran?

Per the constitution, Iran’s First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber becomes acting president. If you haven’t heard of him, don’t worry: neither have any of the pundits and media figures who will become overnight experts on the guy. While Mokhber has ties both numerous and deep to several institutions within the Islamic Republic, he is the definition of a loyalist benchwarmer. By design.

The Iranian constitution lays out that Acting President Mokhber, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament and the head of the judiciary must arrange for a new election in 50 days. (Contrast this with the US, where VP Kamala Harris would simply serve the rest of President Joe Biden’s term). This is where things might get tricky.

Raisi joins a growing line of Iranian presidents who have overseen brutal crackdowns on Iranian protests. Many within Iran will cheer his passing. Will his death and upcoming elections trigger fresh protests?

This is certainly possible and, if I was a betting man, I’d say probably likely. If for no other reason, protests are no longer a rare or unlikely occurrence within Iranian society. I don’t expect them to fundamentally hasten the end of the regime, though it could distract Tehran from its current regional adventures (Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and to the extent they have influence, Hamas). But history also shows us that when Iran is more insecure about domestic security, it is more likely to remind regional adversaries of just how hard it can hit beyond its borders.