3,293 words

The Polish parliamentary elections of October 2023 promised to answer the ultimate question of Polish politics: whether the ruling party — in this case Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, or Law & Justice (PiS) — can break the curse and rule for a third time in a row, something which had never been achieved before in the 33 years of Polish democracy, or will it adhere to the iron rule of Polish politics and lose to the main opposition party after being in power for two terms? Law & Justice managed to achieve both — and now let us break the issue down into some interesting details.

The main players in the elections

The main player was of course the ruling PiS. Having ruled for the last two terms, since 2015, the whole parliamentary election of 2023 quickly turned into a sort of “for/against the current government” referendum. PiS decided to ride this wave — which was quite a risky decision, considering that they had won the 2015 elections through exactly the same sort of referendum, which was “for/against” the liberal Platforma Obywatelska, or Civic Platform government. PiS’ entire campaign was based on presenting themselves as the “normal party for normal people,” a voice of reason, and a guarantee of not overturning any of the pro-social policies which the government has introduced since 2015.

Furthermore, the government decided to raise the stakes even higher by adding an actual referendum to the elections. This referendum consisted of four questions regarding selling state property and land to foreign entities, raising the retirement age, removing the wall along the border with Belarus (which was built to stop the influx of illegal non-white immigrants being sent by the Lukashenko regime), and accepting illegal immigrants from the Middle East and Africa. The PiS government is against all four — just as are the vast majority of Poles. The ruling Prime Minister, who is the post that is the most important figure in the Polish political system, is Mateusz Morawiecki, the son of the radical anti-Communist opposition legend Kornel Morawiecki, although he himself is a former manager from the banking sector and an upper-middle-class corporate technocrat of the Western European establishment variety. But the actual leader of the party is Jarosław Kaczyński, the twin brother of Lech Kaczyński, the Polish President who was killed in the Smoleńsk plane crash of 2010. Kaczyński, just like his political idol, the pre-war Polish leader Józef Piłsudski, occupies no significant political positions, but rather drives the whole government from the back seat — which is more than just a metaphor, as Kaczyński is infamous for not having a driver’s license, nor a bank account, and being a lonesome old bachelor living with his cats.

The main opposition player is the Civic Coalition, an entity formed by the Civic Platform, the largest opposition party and the previously ruling one. Their idea was to unite all of the opposition under one banner. This failed, however, and Civic Platform was left in a coalition of their own with some minor parties to avoid the ridicule of creating a coalition consisting only of themselves. The Civic Coalition’s main political platform — and in reality, that of the Civic Platform — is basically bringing the Civic Platform back to power. Their two main slogans during the campaign was, on the one hand, pointing out the faults of the PiS government (some of which were true, some of which were false), and on the other adhering to the nostalgia for the time of their own government (2007-2015) — which was quite a good time for the Polish upper middle class, but not necessarily for anyone else. The leader of both the Civic Party and Civic Coalition is Donald Tusk, the former Prime Minister, who abandoned his government, once their poll numbers started to sink. He then ran away to Brussels to become the president of the European Council — a typical European Union position with little responsibilities, but huge benefits. Tusk presents himself as the “man from Brussels” who will restore good relationships with the EU and Germany, and thus bring a flurry of European grants to all Polish citizens.

The third main player is the Trzecia Droga, or Third Way coalition. This was an unexpected union of two small Polish parties: Polska 2050, or Poland 2050, and Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, or Polish People’s Party. Poland 2050 is the youngest mainstream Polish party and was founded by the television celebrity Szymon Hołownia, who is the epitome of a normie, middle-aged nice guy who mildly agrees with everyone and is constantly surprised that we can’t all just get along. The only thing that sets him apart from his constituency is his staunch Catholicism (though it is a liberal form of Catholicism). Hołownia has become a household name in Poland by being one of the hosts of the Poland’s Got Talent TV show. Poland 2050 is fake populism for the middle-aged, middle class normies. While declaring that they are “outside of the political establishment,” what they propose is a mild, liberal centrism. Thus, they support open borders — but not too open. They support securing the border — but not too much. They support the traditional family — but not too traditional. They support LGBT rights — but not too many rights. And so on.

The other party of the coalition is the Polish People’s Party, which is the oldest Polish political party, hailing back to the end of the nineteenth century, and thus even predating Poland regaining its independence from Russia in 1918. This is a traditional agrarian party which has withstood the Second Polish Republic (being one of the largest official parties), the occupations by the Third Reich and the Soviet Union (by operating underground and abroad), Communism (by operating as a so-called “satellite party” of the Communist Party), and finally by rebranding itself as a modern rural party in 1990. However, this withstanding of all political systems has turned the party into the greediest of all Polish political entities, which has almost nothing to do with the original agrarian ideology it has created and shaped, with the main focus being on securing government positions for its members. The Polish People’s Party is infamous as being a party with no agenda and no ideals that will form a coalition with anyone, and that can secure them participation in the government — hence their previous participation in Polish democratic governments of all colors and shades. Thus, this unlikely coalition of the youngest and the oldest Polish parties turns out to be much more likely, taking into consideration the eagerness of both to enter Parliament. Third Way’s campaign was based on presenting themselves as being outside the PiS-versus-Civic Coalition conflict and having a normal (lukewarm) agenda for normal (lukewarm) people.

The fourth main player is Nowa Lewica, or New Left, a coalition of various small Leftist parties. We should emphasize that the Polish Left has abandoned both of the Polish Leftist traditions: the patriotic socialist tradition, which was the original environment of the previously mentioned Józef Piłsudski, and the Communist tradition. New Left is a coalition of old post-Communists who were young Communists at the time of the fall of the Communist system in Poland, and young Left-liberal activists with dyed hair and lots of pronouns. And yes, this means a coalition of former Communist officials who were orchestrating hardcore persecutions of homosexuals by the Polish People’s Republic with LGBT activists who are now orchestrating pride parades. The unifying factor at play is their hatred of anything Polish and traditional, combined with their love for financial grants from George Soros. This Left has little support from actual workers or any traditional constituency of both of the older Polish Leftist traditions. Instead, New Left appeals to young urbanites with slogans of sexual liberation and fighting fascism — which makes it a Polish copy of the Western Left.

Finally, the last main player is Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość, or Confederation Liberty & Independence. This is an umbrella party of various marginal and splinter parties. It is often presented in the media as nationalist or fascist, but this is far from truth. It is a party made up of various former libertarians, conservatives, nationalists, anarcho-capitalists, anti-vaxxers, anti-abortion activists, and others — although not much of this is reflected in the party’s agenda. The whole identity of Confederation is based on contrarianism. Whatever issue is a part of the mainstream’s political and social consensus, Confederation says “No!” All the main parties — and most of the Poles — agree that social policies are a good thing, while Confederation is against social policies. All the main parties — and most of the Poles — agree that Poland should support Ukraine in the war against Russia, while Confederation is against supporting Ukraine. There is a method to this madness: Confederacy managed to secure a small but steady following, thus securing their presence in Parliament.

Before the elections

Without getting too much into the details, let us just emphasize that the struggle between the parties before the elections was really dirty and fierce, probably the worst in the short history of modern Polish democracy. The turning point of the campaign was the declaration of the “opposition pact”: Civic Platform, Third Way, and New Left have declared that even though they are running as separate entities, after the elections — if their results allow — they will form a new government together. On the other hand, Confederation has declared that they will not enter a coalition either with Law & Justice, nor with the opposition pact. This has set the stage for a fierce fight by Law & Justice: For them it was all or nothing — either they win enough seats in Parliament to form their own majority government, or they lose the elections altogether, as they have no opportunity to form a government coalition with any of the other parties. To further fuel the political flames, the opposition pact has presented an agenda which they declared they would follow in their first 100 days in office, which includes such points as putting both the Law & Justice officials and the current President on trial.

A very interesting phenomenon which had not been that visible during previous elections in Poland was the level of involvement by outside forces. For months before the election, it was impossible to watch YouTube or browse social media without being bombed by advertising calling to take part in the elections — ads especially aimed at young women, whose rights were allegedly going to be taken away by the “evil fascists” from Law & Justice and Confederation (even though the two parties are in total conflict and never cooperate on any major issues). These ads were financed by “non-political Non-Governmental Organizations,” which in Poland is a code word for either the Polish branches of liberal German entities or the tentacles of the Soros octopus. The Left and the liberals placed their bets on high voter turnout, especially among social groups such as young women, who according to surveys were their potential constituency.

The results of the elections

After all was said and done, the results of the October 15, 2023 parliamentary elections were as follows:

Law & Justice: 35.38%
Civic Coalition: 30.70%
Third Way: 14.40%
New Left: 8.61%
Confederation: 7.16%

Thus, Law & Justice has both won and lost the election. They got the most votes, but winning 194 seats out of 460 does not enable them to form a majority government of their own. And without the possibility of entering a coalition with any of the other parties, they are unable to form a government. Law & Justice did not in fact lose followers; when it comes to actual numbers, they got the most votes of any election they have ever participated in. But the key factor was the highest voter turnout (74.38%) of any Polish election so far. It was the mobilization of the current government’s opponents that decided the results.

Probably the most interesting notion after the elections is the idea that Polish political scene is becoming almost identical to the Western European political scenes. The traditional Polish political division since the 1980s was “Solidarity versus the Communists,” which later mutated into “post-Solidarity versus post-Communists.” And while the main players in Polish politics have their roots in this tradition, it seems that they have actually grown out of it. The “Solidarity versus Communists” conflict is becoming a thing of the distant past, especially for the younger generations, who were not only born after the fall — or rather controlled transformation — of the Communist system in 1989, but the youngest generation of voters does not even remember Poland before it joined the European Union in 2004. Thus, the Polish political scene is becoming almost identical to the Western European ones with a centrist liberal establishment party, a populist party, and the Left.

The most unfortunate result of the elections was not the elections themselves, but rather the results of the referendum. Law & Justice had a good idea in asking questions on which the majority of Poles are of the same mind as the government. And according to the Polish law, if voter turnout during a national referendum is above 50%, the result is binding, regardless of which party is currently in power. However, the opposition called on its supporters to boycott the referendum and take part only in the parliamentary elections. Unfortunately, they succeeded, and many voters refused to participate in the referendum. The voter turnout for the referendum was only 44%, with over 95% of participants supporting the Law & Justice policies on all four questions, thus making the result not binding. This is a very sad result, as Poles had the chance to secure their social and national interests, regardless of who would form the next government, but they refused to do so merely to show their discontent with the Law & Justice party.

The eight years of Law & Justice government: pros and cons

The two terms of the Law & Justice government had their pros and cons. First of all, we must emphasize that the government has not been as conservative as the media, both Polish and foreign, has portrayed it. Law & Justice is a mildly conservative (when it comes to values) and rather social (when it comes to social policies) party, just as the majority of Polish society. And all the main players, apart from the Left and Confederation, presented themselves as such before the elections, trying to convince the same majority of Poles that they would best realize this mildly conservative and rather social agenda in the future.

The main accomplishment of the Law & Justice party was the introduction of social aid programs. The most important one is the 500+ program, which is based on the basic idea that every family with children receives 500 Polish złotys every month for each child in the family, regardless of the family’s financial status. This one was followed by other programs based on the simple idea of giving money to those who lack it, such as paying a thirteenth pension to pensioners each year or providing additional financial aid to families with children in September, when the school year is starting. The government has also provided financial aid to businesses affected by the COVID restrictions, suspended the Value-Added Tax on food (to lower the costs of inflation), and provided relief to those who are struggling with rising mortgage costs. This was a turning point in Polish society, as these social policies went against the previously-held dogmas of liberal economics — and they turned out to be quite effective in combating poverty and stimulating the whole Polish economy. No future government will have the courage to nullify these programs, as they would lose the elections immediately.

Another accomplishment was the firm turn in international politics, which meant securing Poland’s interests in its conflicts with the EU bureaucracy, and especially in terms of coordinating the military aid provided by the West to Ukraine in their war against neo-Soviet imperialism. Law & Justice have also created a caste of Polish businessmen who are running large, partly state-owned businesses — which might not be the best option possible, but is still better than letting international corporations take over whole branches of national industry.

The main fault of the Law & Justice government was its introduction of masses of non-white immigrants into Poland. Despite all the talk of not letting illegal immigrants into Poland, in accordance with the worst conservative tradition Law & Justice has let in huge numbers of legal non-white immigrants in order to please big business and corporations. How many exactly we do not know, as these figures are one of the government’s best-kept secrets. While Poland may not have yet reached the migration levels of Western European capital cities, it is now difficult to walk the streets of any Polish city — and even of many Polish towns — and not see a bunch of non-whites, something which was undreamed of even around ten years ago. This is widely rejected by Polish society. There was also a visa scandal that resulted when it was made public that corrupt Foreign Ministry officials were issuing thousands of work visas to migrants from Africa and Asia. This broke just before the elections and was one of the nails in the Law & Justice government’s coffin. On the other hand, the aid provided by Poland and Poles to the Ukrainian refugees in 2022 was a great display of white solidarity — with an emphasis on white, as non-whites from Ukraine were not welcomed in Poland.

The main problem with the Law & Justice government is what they have not done. They have not fixed the healthcare system, the education system, nor the court system in Poland. A little-known fact is that Jarosław Kaczyński is a great proponent of animal welfare, and he forced the government to enact legal reforms to secure animal rights, such as banning the halal/kosher torture of animals and a ban on fur farms. However, he failed in this endeavor, facing firm opposition from the meat industry lobby.

Law & Justice had some tough luck during their second term: first the COVID epidemic, then the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and finally the resulting inflation from both. All of this has greatly affected the regular people in Poland, and while the majority of people agree that Law & Justice has managed these issues rather well, living conditions in Poland have dropped since 2020. People are tired of these worsening conditions, and perhaps any party that was in power during this difficult time would have lost power in the next elections as a result of the anguish and frustration in society.

What happens next?

In the Polish political system, the President asks the leader of the winning party to form the government, which later needs to win a vote of confidence by Parliament. If this fails, the President asks the leader of the second-place party to form a government, which again requires a vote of confidence by Parliament. Regardless of whether President Andrzej Duda, who was originally from the Law & Justice party himself, asks Jarosław Kaczyński or Donald Tusk to form a government, it is quite possible that neither of them will manage to get a vote of confidence from Parliament. It is also possible for Law & Justice to try to form a minority government. If these attempts fail, there is a possibility of another parliamentary election — and with a lower voter turnout, it is possible that Law & Justice will get enough votes to form a majority government of their own.

Anything is possible at the moment — but one thing is clear: not much will change in Poland. Poles are still mildly conservative when it comes to values and rather social when it comes to policy. Both Law & Justice and the “opposition pact” have declared that they will maintain these policies — with the “opposition pact” being a bit more liberal. The Left is still a minor power in Poland, and even if it enters the government, it will not be able to enforce its anti-national policies. At least not now.

*  *  *

Counter-Currents has extended special privileges to those who donate at least $10/month or $120/year.

1. Donors will have immediate access to all Counter-Currents posts. Everyone else will find that one post a day, five posts a week will be behind a “paywall” and will be available to the general public after 30 days. Naturally, we do not grant permission to other websites to repost paywall content before 30 days have passed.


2. Paywall member comments will appear immediately instead of waiting in a moderation queue. (People who abuse this privilege will lose it.)


3. Paywall members have the option of editing their comments.


4. Paywall members get an Badge badge on their comments.


5. Paywall members can “like” comments.


6. Paywall members can “commission” a yearly article from Counter-Currents. Just send a question that you’d like to have discussed to [email protected]. (Obviously, the topics must be suitable to Counter-Currents and its broader project, as well as the interests and expertise of our writers.)

To get full access to all content behind the paywall, please visit our redesigned Paywall page.